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Abstract
We present the ﬁrst social network analysis of purposive and coordinated interest group relationships. We utilize a network measure
based on cosigner status to United States Supreme Court amicus curiae, or friend of the court briefs. The illuminated structures lend
insight into the central players and overall formation of the network
over the ﬁrst seven years of the 21st century. We ﬁnd that the majority
of interest groups primarily partake in coalition strategies with other
groups of similar policy interest and ideological character. This is in
contrast to previous literature that focused only on one or the other.
The factions are tied together by various central players, who act as
hubs, leaving a disparate collection of organizations that work alone.
Network analysis provides evidence, for example, that the National
Wildlife Foundation, the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers and the American Civil Liberties Union are all particularly
strong groups, but exploit diﬀerent central roles. Ultimately, our work
and data suggest several subsequent questions and opportunities pertaining to the coalition strategies of interest groups.

1

Winning in front of the courts, the legislative arena, or the executive
branch is not a solitary act. While interest groups use a variety of techniques
to exert inﬂuence, coalition strategies are the dominant lobbying technique.
That is, interest groups do not work alone. However, interest group coalitions
remain signiﬁcantly understudied.
Hula (1999) argues that interest groups form coalitions to pursue their
strategic goals at reduced costs, shape public debate by inﬂuencing a broader
platform, gather information, and receive symbolic beneﬁts. Further, he emphasizes the need to explain interest group coalitions, which can be viewed as
institutions of collective leadership, bargaining, and strategy among member
organizations. In other words, it is necessary to understand interest groups
as part of a network and the relationships among them. In this piece, we
examine the networks of interest groups for insight into the central players
and key relationships among them.
Amicus curiae briefs, or friend of the court briefs, are a prime example
of interest group coalitions formed to impact governmental decision making
and policy. These coordinated, purposive interest group networks are the
focus of our research. Examining interest group networks will lead to a better
understanding of the interaction of the multitude of players and groups in our
democratic system. Contrary to previous attempts at interest group network
analysis, these analyses provide ﬁrm, speciﬁc, and public commitments of
interest groups on matters of great concern. Thus, this network matters
most to interest groups.
We achieve a unique perspective by applying network theory and methods to the study of interest groups. For example, network theory suggests
that more open networks (weak ties and connections) results in a higher
probability of introducing new ideas and opportunities (Granovetter 1973).
Ideologically extreme liberal or extreme conservative groups are expected to
have tighter networks. We examine the networks created over time and subsequently disaggregate the networks to illuminate the most valuable member
organizations. Understanding the existence and density of brokers within
networks, which serve as the bridges that ﬁll structural holes, will be useful
in further characterizing and distinguishing interest group networks.
A network perspective provides a lens where the attributes of individuals
are as important as the relationships and ties with other actors in the network. This new theoretical perspective is particularly apt for the study of
interest groups. After all, the relative strength of interest groups is directly
tied to their relationships. Rather than by solitary action, interest groups
2

beneﬁt and suﬀer by virtue of their ties. Thus to understand the behavior
and success of interest groups requires a holistic approach that accounts for
their purposive and coordinated actions.

1

Interest Group Networks

Classic works in the interest group literature have sought to understand why
interest group coalitions form. A discussion of resources initiates most scholarly work on this topic. That is, scholars maintain that coalitions serve
as an economical and eﬃcient means to form a more powerful bloc (e.g.,
Berry 1977, Berry & Wilcox 1989, Schlozman & Tierney 1986, Hula 1995,
Hojnacki 1998, Whitford 2003). Hojnacki’s (1998) theory of strategic coalition formation summarizes the factors inﬂuencing coalition formation as perceived strength of the opposition, previous experience in a coalition, whether
the group is pivotal, and whether the group is critical to the success of the
coalition.1 Coalitions then signal broad support to policy makers on an issue
(Mayhew 1974, Kingdon 1981, Esterling 2004, Mahoney 2004).
Social network theory also suggests that alliances form out of the pursuit
for access to resources and information (Gilsing et al. 2008). That is, coalitions function as ‘pipelines’ through which information and knowledge ﬂow.
The incentive for interest groups to form networks appears to be similar to
that of ﬁrms: to share information and to diﬀuse information more quickly or
to enhance the eﬃciency of cooperation (Teece 1986, Whitford 2003, Gilsing
2005, Gilsing et al. 2008). In addition, there are control beneﬁts, such as
sanctions, reputation, and trust. The social network literature discusses the
positive eﬀects of networks on group performance; growth (Powell, Koput
& Smith-Doerr 1996), speed of innovation (Hagedoorn 1993), organizational
learning (Hamel 1991), and reputation (Stuart 1998).
Bacheller (1977) emphasizes the importance of both group characteristics
and group relationships for a complete understanding of the role of interest
groups. The interest group literature provides an extensive and thorough
1

Some interest coalition formation literature distinguishes types of interest groups,
arguing that diﬀerent types of interest groups are more or less likely to join coalitions
(Clark & Wilson 1961, Caldeira & Wright 1990). This suggests that one should account
for the type of interest group, such as whether it is a trade association, citizen group, or
union, though Mahoney (2004) did not ﬁnd this distinction to be statistically signiﬁcant
in their recent work.
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examination of individual group characteristics. In spite of strong interest in group relationships, (e.g., Heinz et al. 1993, Carpenter, Esterling &
Lazer 1998a), heretofore, there has not been much empirical work on group
relationships. Whitford (2003, p. 46) states that “as recent studies suggest,
the network aspects of group coordination - the speciﬁc interconnections between groups - may be as important as whether participation occurs at all.”
Our work brings renewed focus on the interconnections between groups.
Using coalitions formed by the interest groups themselves when signing
onto an amicus brief, we arrive at purposive, coordinated actions by the interest groups better suited for our questions about the eﬀectiveness of interest
groups. Our research builds primarily on the path breaking work of Koger
& Victor (2009), LaPira, Thomas & Baumgartner (2009) and Scott (2007).2
Similarly, we agree with Whitford (2003), who explicitly argues for the use
of network analysis as applied to amici and Schlozman et al. (2007) who use
the ﬁling of amicus briefs as a form of “political voice.” The latter is of
particular relevance and guidance, in so far as they suggest the importance
of studying amicus briefs as indicators of cooperative alliances; however their
piece stops short of a network analysis of such.
LaPira, Thomas & Baumgartner (2009) are one of the ﬁrst to map interest groups. They use the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) data to measure
interest group networks as joined by issue areas. This piece links groups if
they work on the same topic. They identify which policy areas are highly
central to the overall network structure and show that central and peripheral
policy domains are populated by diﬀerent types of lobbyists: policy generalists versus specialists. A drawback of this work for our purposes is that
interest groups are being mixed regardless of whether they are for or against
an issue and whether or not there was coordinated action. One would expect
that there are areas where the sides are not equally distributed in terms of
resources and networking, and this is muddled in network measures based on
the LDA.
Using campaign ﬁnance data to build interest group networks gets at direction better. This path has been forged by Koger & Victor (2009). Koger
2
Scott’s (2007) work which identiﬁes interest group coalitions via archived websites and
interviews is particularly appealing because he tries to identify all players in a coalition.
However, this is unrealistic for all networks, due to many coalitions not being reported in
the press or recorded on the participating group’s website (e.g., Mayer 2007, Cummings
2008). In addition, interviews are diﬃcult to use due to the passage of time and the
diﬃculty of collecting full network information across all possible issues.
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& Victor (2009) focus on the links between members of Congress and interest groups. Here interest groups are in the same network if they gave
a contribution to the same member of Congress. However, groups can be
associated almost by accident as there is not likely to be coordination for
almost all of the contributions. In addition, groups are crossing issue areas in these network measures. That is, groups are in a network because
both gave a contribution to a particular member, but the ﬁrst group may
do so because of interest in issue A whereas another group may contribute
to the same member because of interest in issue B. Finally, even though we
may expect lobbyists to primarily lobby their friends in Congress (Hall &
Miller 2008, Box-Steﬀensmeier & Dow 1992, Box-Steﬀensmeier & Lin 1997),
two independent interest groups might contribute campaign donations to the
same legislator on the same issue, e.g., issue A, but be contributing to move
the member in opposing directions.3 Thus while the donation data provides
more detail in terms of interest group networks, it still lacks the direction we
would desire from an ideal measure.
As suggested above, a ﬂurry of recent and notable scholarly activity has
surrounded the coalition strategies of interest groups. The reason for this
is undoubtedly twofold: 1) the questions are of great interest to a host of
political scientists, having received an unusually low amount of empirical attention in the past; and 2) technological advancement in personal computing
has made the empirical analysis of large, aggregate data sets possible. Each
network measure, including the amicus brief cosignatories, has its own pros
and cons. Ultimately, each serves to illuminate a diﬀerent aspect of a host of
potential relationships. Below we detail our theoretical expectations about
interest group coalitions and then test the extent to which the amicus curiae
briefs cosignatories network conﬁrms or casts doubt on our expectations of
interest group networks.

1.1

Resource Mobilization Theory & Networks

The linkages chosen to derive the interest group network implies the underlying theory. That is, the choice of the link conveys how one believes lobbyists
work together. We argue that a purposive, coordinated, and public linkage
provides the most theoretically sound approach to characterizing the network
3

This may occur the most for members that are moderate on the issue or cross-pressured
by ideology or constituency groups.
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of interest groups. The two previous approaches that have tied together interest groups have focused on: 1) the same issue area (studies based on issue
area linkages and the LDA data set), or 2) contributions to the same candidate (campaign donations). To those we add a third linkage based on publicly
visible work in the same issue areas plus a shared ideological orientation.
While at ﬁrst blush these appear as only methodological or measurement
concerns, theoretically these approaches are related to pluralist, representative and purposive frameworks, respectively. If one contends that interest
groups working on the same issue are sharing information, that suggests
a kind of optimistic and transparent perspective of interest groups based
on pluralist notions Truman (1951). In contrast, if one thinks that interest groups who contribute to the same candidate are working together,
a representative focus is brought to bear. In this case communication is
largely through the electoral process and money buys inﬂuence or at least
access, which harks back to Hall & Wayman’s (1990) classic article (see also
Lowi 1979, Wright 1990). Alternatively, we argue that interest group coalitions are, in actuality, only those that are directed, coordinated and visible
to a third party. This approach has roots in theories of resource mobilization
(e.g., Walker 1991) and organizational behavior (e.g., Wilson 1973). Such is,
at the very least, a more complete measure that contains aspects of the two
prior frameworks.
The resource mobilization school provides key insights into interest group
network formation. Here organization is largely a purposive act Hathaway &
Meyer (1997) for shared survival (McCarthy & Zald 1977, McCarthy 1987).
In order to attain their goals, groups need to engage collective action and social choice simultaneously. Via the pooling of their resources and the creation
of some exhibit of their shared policy preferences, groups choose to work together. In particular, interest groups occasionally do so in the public’s eye.
Because signing an amicus brief is not just an act of persuasion but also a
symbolic gesture, in the sense that it can be an illustration of their work for
their constituency, the brief also helps to maintain their public status among
the hierarchy of interest groups.
Of course, groups must also maintain some autonomy, or risk dissolution
to the members of their coalition. Thus interest groups have to balance cooperation and diﬀerentiation. They have to be diﬀerent enough as to attract
a distinct constituency despite wanting to cooperate when they believe it will
be helpful to attain mutually valued resources. Such is at the foundation of
economic theories of organizational behavior (Wilson 1973). Interest groups
6

need a niche in order to maintain their existence. Collective action here is
thus a delicate balance. However, there are times when working together
greatly outweighs the risks of exposing shared issue dimensions.
Staggenborg (1986) showed that the threat of big losses or gains is the best
motivator for organizational cooperation, which largely supports our study
of U.S. Supreme Court cases, as the range, jurisdiction, and visibility of the
cases are the highest in the land. Furthermore, because the cases before the
court largely concern “inclusive goods”, Olson (1965) provides good reason
to expect the likelihood of organization to be greater here than elsewhere.
When the resulting goods have near universal eﬀects, the potential for shared
beneﬁts motivate shared eﬀorts. Such is often not the case, for example, in
many legislative activies, where goods are particularistic or “exclusive.”
The underlying networks of interest groups are especially diﬃcult to perceive. It is widely acknowledged that they exist, but interest groups are
unlikely to be forthcoming about their contacts, as their livelihood depends
on restricted access to these sources and the public perception of a niche
(see Mayer 2007, Cummings 2008). Furthermore, the work of interest groups
is both autonomous and cooperative. At times interest groups work alone
to accomplish goals particular to their constituency. At other times, interest
groups join together to achieve mutually beneﬁcial goals. We exploit theories
of resource mobilization and organization to specify the times at which we
might expect these key networks of interest groups to become visible, namely
in amicus curiae briefs before the U.S. Supreme Court.

2

Data & Network Structure

In order to study the formation of and key players in interest group networks,
we utilize a particular, yet comprehensive, interest group database. We collect a list of all the interest groups that have signed onto an amicus brief
from 1953 to the present. The analysis below, however, only presents data
from the ﬁrst seven years of the 21st century. From this list, we use cosignatories to map the ﬁrst (as far as we are aware) comprehensive, purposive,
and coordinated interest group network.
In Supreme Court cases, various parties with related interests submit
briefs to the Court in favor of the petitioner, respondent, or in some cases,
neither. Cosigners on amicus curiae briefs coordinate the content of the
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briefs and signatories.4 Often times, these cosigners are comprised of interest
groups. A large percentage of amicus briefs come from interest groups (see
Table 3.3, Collins 2008). We explore the use of this coordinated action as a
measure of interest group networks. We argue that amicus curiae cosigning
provides a better measure of interest group networks than the existent, yet
nascent, literature.
The earliest papers found that approximately ﬁfty percent of interest
groups indicated in surveys that they have participated in writing amicus
briefs when asked about activity in the last two years, (e.g., Solberg &
Waltenburg 2006, Scheppele & Walker 1991). Schlozman & Tierney (1986)
ask interest groups about litigation or otherwise using the courts and reported that over seventy percent of groups did so. Our comprehensive list
of amici will allow us to get as reliable measure as possible because we can
compare it to databases of interest groups. We will also be able to see if
the number of groups participating in the process has increased over time as
some have posited. Kearney & Merrill (2000) ﬁnd that the number is closer
to eighty percent and Almeida (2004) ﬁnds seventy-six percent. Whitford
(2003) argues that because judicial strategies are high cost eﬀorts, coalitions
are optimal strategies, and concludes that the eighty percent participation
rate over two years seems reasonable.
In short, the network measure has a number of desirable properties. First,
it is naturally occurring in the function of government activity. Our data is
not based on surveys, contrived settings or incidental links, but culled from
the actual, purposive and coordinated work of interest groups in front of
the Court. Second, we come close to a complete network of the population
of interest, with an increasing probability of capturing the full population
given larger time spans. Third, the data we have gathered are longitudinal,
which is of fundamental merit for those, like us, interested in the evolution of
complex social networks (Burt 2000, Rogers 1987, Marsden 1990, Christakis
& Fowler N.d.).
4

The term “cosigners” is sometimes used to distinguish the individual or group that
initiated the brief from others that signed onto it. We use the term here to refer to everyone
on the brief as a cosigner(see also Gibson 1997). We would like to distinguish the initiator
and use the associated network methods that take this into account, however, it is not
empirically possible in the data.
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2.1

Graphing the Networks

Who are the key opinion leaders and inﬂuentials? Where does inﬂuence
ﬂow? Who are the “connectors” (those who connect the unconnected in the
network) and the “mavens” (who are sought out for knowledge)? Where is
the power in the networks? The ﬁrst major part of the project and the focus
of this paper applies basic network analysis to the interest group arena. We
begin to answer the questions posed by mapping the full network created by
interest group interaction in signing amicus briefs.
Figure 1 displays the network mapping of over 4,100 unique interest
groups that have signed amicus briefs on USSC per curiam or full opinions
from 2000 to 2007. We have chosen the most recent cases available from the
Spaeth (1953) data set and broken them up in terms of congressional cycles,
where possible. In addition, we look at the network across all seven years,
recognizing that ties between groups will not always be apparent within short
windows of time. Speciﬁcally, there are 4,111 organizations that signed onto
2,469 amicus briefs on 456 cases in this data set.
Here the nodes represent interest groups. Interest groups that are linked
together by virtue of signing the same amicus briefs are denoted by way of
a joining edge. While the linked groups have cosigned at least one or more
amicus briefs, the stand-alone groups have signed one or more amicus briefs
without cosignatories in this period.
All of the interest group relationships are symmetric, or undirected, because they represent a mere cosigning of an amicus brief. Despite the fact
that one of the organizations is listed ﬁrst as the ﬁler of the amicus brief,
to give more weight to such an organization would be inappropriate. Often
times the reports are ﬁled alphabetically or in some other manner that gives
no indication as to a lead signatory (see also Gibson 1997). Thus, without further examination of the briefs, all cosignatories should be considered
equally in the network. Thus the data does not speciﬁcally indicate which
group ﬁrst contacted its cosignatories or did the bulk of the work on the brief.
However, the mapping of the full network does provide invaluable insight into
the most likely ﬁrst movers and dominant players.
Reciprocity is an invaluable measure in the study of directed networks.
It tells the extent to which any group sought out by another group returns
the favor. More formally, reciprocity is the fraction of pairs of nodes within
the graph that are symmetric. Here the interest group links are undirected
and thus we arrive at a perfect fraction of symmetry, or 1. Unfortunately,
9

Figure 1: Interest Group Networks Over Time
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2000−07
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our data does not tell us about the direction of the contact, i.e., which group
contacted which ﬁrst or which took the lead on the amicus brief. Such is as
it should be, because interest groups that sign amici do so in no particular
order. Rather, in an attempt to understand the key players in the network we
gather perspective from the quantity of signatures and the resulting network
structure.
Figure 1 illustrates that over time the tightly grouped factions are indirectly linked to other factions via various hub organizations. In the ﬁnal
summation ﬁgure with the full mapping of 2000 to 2007 signatories, there is
the obvious presence of various solitary workers on the periphery of the graph.
However, it is also clear that as time goes on more direct and indirect links
are illuminated, suggesting much more complex and distant relationships.
In this analysis, we have chosen to only link those interest groups that
have signed the same brief. An alternative approach would be to link all
interest groups that sign a brief in the same direction (i.e. for respondent or
petitioner or neither). Such would certainly create a denser or more linked
network of interest groups based on both issue area and ideological direction; however it would not signify any sort of coordinated action on the part
of the signers. Coordinated action is central to our beliefs about interest
group networks, because it denotes a deliberate link between organizations.
While interest groups undoubtedly interact broadly, an interest group network based on amicus briefs suggests, at a minimum, a regular contact, or a
“weak tie” (Carpenter, Esterling & Lazer 1998b).
We can look at the centrality, transitivity, size, and density of networks
and their ability to evolve over time as indicators of interest group coalition
strategies. Table 3 provides some basic properties of the network. At the
structural level, the density of the network is the number of edges divided by
the number of possible edges in the graph. In substantive terms, we might
think about density as the connectedness of the entire network of interest
groups. Years and cycles range from .011 to .046, but the overall low .006
score suggests that many of the interest groups are not connected to as
many of the others as they could be. Interest groups do not reach out to
all stakeholders, but only a certain set of them. Thus instead of many weak
ties, the networks appear comprised largely of factions.
Transitivity moves us to considerations of indirect relationships. It tells
us the extent to which two interest groups indirectly linked by a third interest
group are also directly linked themselves. This is almost always the case in
the interest group networks. It appears that in interest group networks being
11

a friend of a friend also means you are a friend. Interestingly, the minimum
value is .846, held by the 2000 to 2007 window. Thus as opportunities for
interest group coalitions increase, so too does the presence of indirect links
between groups. In shorter periods, however, we note the greater potential
for groups to enter that are part of interconnected relationships.
The general centralization score provides a kind of average value of the
centrality of all the interest groups in the network. More formally, it is the
diﬀerence between the maximum and mean node centrality score conditional
on the number of nodes (see below for a discussion of node centrality). Here
the centrality scores for most of the interest groups are quite similar resulting
in a low centralization index for the total network of .040.5
Table 1: Interest Group Network Properties
Graph
Structure
Density
Transitivity
Centralization
Reciprocity
USSC Cases
USSC AC Briefs
Interest Groups

2000
0.017
0.864
0.081
1

2001
–02
0.011
0.867
0.054
1

2003
–04
0.017
0.976
0.055
1

2005
–06
0.012
0.950
0.060
1

2007
0.046
0.929
0.160
1

2000
–07
0.006
0.846
0.040
1

69
311
730

140
763
1581

120
640
1660

107
624
1041

20
131
430

456
2469
4111

Signatories refers to the total number of organizations that signed an
amicus curiae (AC) brief in the respective period.

We believe that these networks will be shown to be even more illuminating
when considered over even longer time spans. True interest group networks
are unlikely to be formed or demonstrated in a short period; rather we expect
them to develop over time as trust accrues between groups of common interest
and shared values. In addition, looking at a short time span engages only
a small portion of the total issues encountered by the USSC. While large
percentages of interest groups are known to sign onto amicus briefs, such will
not be evident in a short window, such as a year. A congressional cycle and
5

The slight outlier here is 2007, with its small number of cases and interest group
cosignatories.
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the seven year window presented here, however, aﬀord greater insight into
the networks of interest groups.
Interestingly, our the full interest network escapes an easy characterization. The distribution of centrality suggest that both circle and star networks
exist simultaneously (see Barabási 2002). Rather than one or the other, clusters of tightly linked organizations, linked circularly and individually, are
networked to other clusters by hub organizations, creating a sort of large
scale star network.
This glance into the network structures motivates questions of structural
equivalence. To what degree are diﬀerent groups exchangeable in these networks? How are their positions similar across time and in diﬀerent types of
cases? How are the positions of diﬀerent groups in diﬀerent cases similar?
For example, an interest group may have a position in a network on a case
involving patents that is quite similar to a group’s in a case on free speech.
This work allows for structural theories that generalize beyond issues, which
we believe to be a large contribution to the interest groups literature. Thus,
we now turn to an examination of the role of particular groups within the
network.

2.2

Central Players

Hanneman & Riddle (2005) state that all sociologists would agree that power
is a fundamental property of social structures. Importantly, social network
analysis has explicitly developed methods to study power. There are a variety
of network measures that are useful for characterizing and understanding
interest group networks at the node level. Krebs (2004) discusses some useful
measures, such as betweenness, which “measures the control a node has over
what ﬂows in the network - how often is this node on the path between other
nodes?” And closeness, which measures how easily a node can access what
is available via the network - or how quickly can this node reach all others in
the network? A combination where a node has easy access to others, while
controlling the access of other nodes in the network, reveals high informal
power (Krebs 2004). Here we attempt to locate the real weilders of power
among the interest groups.
Table 2 provides some basic properties of the network. Various centrality
indices help characterize the extent to which any particular group plays a
central role in the network (Freeman 1979). In other words, centrality helps
us understand the key interest groups in the network. Here we list the degree,
13

Table 2: Interest Group Node Properties
Node
2000
Centrality
Degree
Mean
12.4
Std Dev
(11.5)
Max
71
Min
0
Betweenness
Mean
157.0
Std Dev
(1037.1)
Max
14111.3
Min
0
Closeness
∀
0

2001
–02

2003
–04

2005
–06

2007

2000
–07

17.3
(19.0)
103
0

27.5
(33.7)
119
0

12.0
(18.9)
74
0

19.9
(20.4)
88
0

23.6
(29.1)
189
0

6.0
(43.3)
528
0

4031.1
(28658.8)
821571.7
0

0

0

763.2
(5429.3)
122707.5
0
0

563.8
95.6
(4108.2) (622.8)
112326.5 10944.2
0
0
0

0

Node structures refer to the average and range for the respective period
with standard deviation in parentheses.

betweenness, and closeness of the groups, which are typical network measures
of centrality.
In our maps of interest groups, degree is simply the number of interest
groups directly linked to any other single group in the network. Degree helps
determine centrality in so far as interest groups with high degree can be
thought of as being directly connected to other interest groups. High degree
interest groups are well connected in that they are signatories on many amicus
briefs. A high degree might therefore signal key players that bring together
other interest groups on common issues. In the network, several interest
groups signed an amicus brief alone, yielding a minimum degree of zero,
however, the best linked interest group, the National Wildlife Foundation
(NWF), was linked to 189 others.
Figure 2 presents the top percentile of degree centrality interest groups.
Given the multiple case framework of the network, the links can be over
several cases and thus repeat players are typically, but not always, those
with a higher degree. Table 2 suggest that on average degree ranges from 12
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Figure 2: Top Percentile Degree Centrality
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to 27.5 across the time frames. The total average degree is 23.6, implying
that over the seven year period any interest group amicus brief ﬁler would
have about 24 cosigners.
Another way an interest group might play a central role is as a middleman
between two other groups. Betweenness measures the number of times an
interest group lies on the shortest path between several other groups. High
betweenness interest groups are then directly along the stream of communication between other interest groups. The average period betweenness ranges
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Figure 3: Top Percentile Betweenness Centrality
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from 157 to 4031 across these networks. Such a large range illustrates that
some interest groups belong to large and intertwined networks, while others
appear as a friend of the Court alone. The highest number, in this case for
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL), suggests
that removing this organization would have a disproportionately large impact on the connections of other groups to each other. The high betweenness
groups are less easily categorized, but appear to revolve around various issue
groups, including: civil rights, mental health, environment, education and
technology, as shown in Figure 3.
Because so many interest groups lack paths to other groups in this net-
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work, i.e., fail to cosign with other interest groups, the range of values for
the centrality measure of closeness is zero. Closeness measures the degree
to which a group is close to all other groups in the graph; thus despite collections of tightly grouped networks the overall graph is quite disconnected.
This window of cases is surprisingly indicative of the complete network as
well. Interest groups continue to sign alone, suggesting that not all interest
groups value these networks equally.
Egocentric Networks
While the average node centrality measures tell us a great deal about the
structure of the network, we next unpack the highest centrality interest
groups and more carefully examine their respective egocentric networks.
These are the key players in the network and may lend insight into the practices of successful interest groups. As mentioned above, two common measures of centrality avail themselves to this study. However, these measures
(by deﬁnition) diﬀered in their selection of the most central interest group.
Degree suggests that the NWF was the most central of interest groups. Betweenness suggests that the NACDL was the most central. While the NWF
was in the top percentile with either measure, the NACDL was only a central
player by measure of betweenness centrality. In typical social science fashion, both measures of centrality are applicable and lend unique insight into
how interest groups can successfully use their networks to accomplish their
objectives.
Figures 4 and 5 present the egocentric networks of the two central players:
NWF and NACDL. It is readily apparent that groups network with others
that share issue area interests as well as ideological positions. Thus contrary
to networks built on the LDA issue areas or contributions alone, the amici
network illustrates links that are based on both issue areas and ideological
direction.
As shown in Figure 4, the NWF cosigned amicus briefs link groups like
various regional wildlife organizations, conservation organizations and more
general non-proﬁt organizations, which may share interests and/or ideology.
Particularly interesting and the reason why it is a central player, is that despite various clusters in the network, the NWF cosigns widely. Other groups
sign exclusively with a seemingly set network of like-minded organizations, illustrated by the tight star-like clusters, but the NWF appears to have broad
interests in cases before the USSC and shares ideological positions with a
17
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Figure 4: Egocentric Network of Central Node by Degree: National Wildlife Foundation

host of groups. Thus the NWF serves as a hub to organizations sharing a
common interest in the environment.
Contrarily, Figure 5, suggests that the NACDL power stems from their
ability to indirectly link a host of seemingly unrelated organizations, which
appear to only share a common left-leaning ideology. Particularly interesting and the reason why it is a central player, is that the seemingly broad
issue interests in the network would not be linked to each other without the
NACDL. The network suggests that the NACDL is a key hub organization
for various groups of a common ideological bent.
Like the NWF, The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) shows up in
the top percentile in both indicators of centrality (see Figures 2 and 3). It
should come as no surprise to ﬁnd the ACLU among those most connected
interest groups before the USSC. The less obvious point is that it is also
among the most central players in terms of betweenness. The ACLU, with
its general scope and pervasive inﬂuence before the USSC, links a host of
interests that would be unrelated otherwise.
Figure 6 illustrates the ACLU’s egocentric network. It exhibits characteristics of both high degree and high betweenness. As such, it looks like
a combination of features from the previous NWF and NACDL networks.
Much like the NWF, the ACLU reaches out to tightly grouped factions, and
much like the NACDL it acts as a central hub for diverse groups with less
obvious commonalities. Why these patterns emerge is among the next steps
on our research agenda.
Mavericks
An alternative way of thinking about these networks would be to consider
the interest groups that do not engage in coalition strategies. While most
network analysis is concerned with the key ﬁgures, equally important insight
can be gleamed by turning network theory on its head. Which groups go at
it alone? Which are the mavericks – the islands?
Figure 7 shows that the histogram of degree centrality for the entire period
has a strongly positive skew. Thus more organizations play peripheral roles
in the network than would be expected of a small world network. In fact,
out of the 4,111 organizations appearing at least once in USSC amicus curiae
briefs, 446, of the organizations had a degree centrality score of zero. That
means that over 10 percent of the observations in the entire period went
without a cosigner. Including degree centrality scores up to 11, brings the
19

20

MEDILL.INNOCENCE.PROJECT
NORML.FOUNDATION
PACE.POST.CONVICTION.PROJECT

RADIO.TELEVISION.NEWS.DIRECTORS.ASSOCIATION

FEMINISTS.FOR.FREE.EXPRESSION

REPORTERS.COMMITTEE.FOR.FREEDOM.OF.THE.PRESS

ANTI.DEFAMATION.LEAGUE
NATIONAL.CONFERENCE.OF.BLACK.LAWYERS

AMERICAN.FREEDOM.AGENDA
PATRIOTS.TO.RESTORE.CHECKS.AND.BALANCES
MUSLIM.PUBLIC.AFFAIRS.COUNCIL
NATIONAL.URBAN.LEAGUE.INSTITUTE.FOR.OPPORTUNITY.AND.EQUALITY
OPEN.SOCIETY.INSTITUTE
RUTHERFORD.INSTITUTE

HUMAN.RIGHTS.WATCH
JEWISH.COUNCIL.FOR.PUBLIC.AFFAIRS

NATIONAL.BLACK.POLICE.ASSOCIATION

NATIONAL.BAR.ASSOCIATION
AMERICAN.CIVIL.LIBERTIES.UNION.OF.MARYLAND

AMERICAN.CIVIL.LIBERTIES.UNION.OF.SOUTHERN.CALIFORNIA

NATIONAL.COUNCIL.OF.THE.CHURCHES.OF.CHRIST.IN.THE.USA
AMERICAN.CIVIL.LIBERTIES.UNION.OF.ILLINOIS
AMERICAN.CIVIL.LIBERTIES.UNION.OF.VIRGINIA
NATIONAL.ASSOCIATION.FOR.THE.ADVANCEMENT.OF.COLORED.PEOPLE.LEGAL.DEFENSE.AND.EDUCATION.FUND
UNION.FOR.REFORM.JUDAISM
NATIONAL.BLACK.LAW.STUDENTS.ASSOCIATION
PEOPLE.FOR.THE.AMERICAN.WAY.FOUNDATION
HUMAN.RIGHTS.FIRST
CONSTITUTION.PROJECT

NATIONAL.ASSOCIATION.OF.SOCIAL.WORKERS
AMERICAN.CIVIL.LIBERTIES.UNION.OF.PENNSYLVANIA

INSTITUTE.FOR.THE.ADVANCED.STUDY.OF.HUMAN.SEXUALITY

AMERICAN.CIVIL.LIBERTIES.UNION

CATO.INSTITUTE
CALIFORNIA.ATTORNEYS.FOR.CRIMINAL.JUSTICE

SOCIETY.OF.PROFESSIONAL.JOURNALISTS

NATIONAL.LEGAL.AID.AND.DEFENDER.ASSOCIATION
LEGAL.AID.SOCIETY.OF.THE.CITY.OF.NEW.YORK

NATIONAL.ASSOCIATION.OF.CRIMINAL.DEFENSE.LAWYERS

AMERICAN.CIVIL.LIBERTIES.UNION.OF.EASTERN.MISSOURI

COMMON.SENSE.FOR.DRUG.POLICY

NATIONAL.ORGANIZATION.FOR.THE.REFORM.OF.MARIJUANA.LAWS

OREGON.CRIMINAL.DEFENSE.LAWYERS.ASSOCIATION

INNOCENCE.PROJECT.OF.FLORIDA
INNOCENCE.PROJECT.OF.NEW.ORLEANS

MIDWEST.INNOCENCE.PROJECT

DEFENDING.IMMIGRANTS.PARTNERSHIP
ALASKA.CIVIL.LIBERTIES.UNION
NEW.YORK.STATE.DEFENDERS.ASSOCIATION

COMMITTEE.FOR.PUBLIC.COUNSEL.SERVICES

AMERICAN.ARAB.ANTI.DISCRIMINATION.COMMITTEE

JUVENILE.LAW.CENTER

CHILD.WELFARE.LEAGUE.OF.AMERICA

ASIAN.LAW.CAUCUS
FLORIDA.PUBLIC.DEFENDER.ASSOCIATION

ASSOCIATION.OF.FEDERAL.DEFENDERS
TEXAS.CRIMINAL.DEFENSE.LAWYERS.ASSOCIATION

NORTH.CAROLINA.CENTER.ON.ACTUAL.INNOCENCE
INNOCENCE.PROJECT

WASHINGTON.ASSOCIATION.OF.CRIMINAL.DEFENSE.LAWYERS

NORTHERN.ARIZONA.JUSTICE.PROJECT

CALIFORNIA.PUBLIC.DEFENDERS.ASSOCIATION
CATHOLIC.LEGAL.IMMIGRATION.NETWORK
WASHINGTON.DEFENDERS.ASSOCIATION
AMERICAN.IMMIGRATION.LAWYERS.ASSOCIATION
NEW.YORK.STATE.ASSOCIATION.OF.CRIMINAL.DEFENSE.LAWYERS

FLORIDA.IMMIGRANT.ADVOCACY.CENTER

MARYLAND.CRIMINAL.DEFENSE.ATTORNEYS.ASSOCIATION

NATIONAL.ASSOCIATION.OF.FEDERAL.DEFENDERS

CENTER.ON.WRONGFUL.CONVICTIONS
FAMILIES.AGAINST.MANDATORY.MINIMUMS
TEXAS.INNOCENCE.NETWORK
LAW.COUNCIL.OF.AUSTRALIA

WISCONSIN.INNOCENCE.PROJECT
NATIONAL.ASSOCIATION.OF.MANUFACTURERS ARIZONA.JUSTICE.PROJECT

Figure 5: Egocentric Network of Central Node by Betweenness: National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers
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CALIFORNIA.WOMENS.LAW.CENTER
CENTER.FOR.CONSTITUTIONAL.RIGHTS
WOMENS.ADVOCACY.PROJECT
NATIONAL.ASSOCIATION.OF.PROTECTION.AND.ADVOCACY.SYSTEMS

PEYOTE.WAY.CHURCH.OF.GOD

NATIONAL.CENTER.FOR.LESBIAN.RIGHTS
GENERAL.ASSEMBLY.OF.THE.PRESBYTERIAN.CHURCH
SIKH.COALITION
CHRISTIAN.LEGAL.SOCIETY
NATIONAL.ASIAN.PACIFIC.AMERICAN.LEGAL.CONSORTIUM
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CALIFORNIA.PRISON.FOCUS

NATIONAL.BLACK.POLICE.ASSOCIATION

AMERICAN.CIVIL.LIBERTIES.UNION.OF.GEORGIA
NATIONAL.CONFERENCE.OF.BLACK.LAWYERS
NATIONAL.LEGAL.AID.AND.DEFENDER.ASSOCIATION
US.PUBLIC.INTEREST.RESEARCH.GROUP
NATIONAL.BLACK.LAW.STUDENTS.ASSOCIATION

NATIONAL.ASSOCIATION.OF.CRIMINAL.DEFENSE.LAWYERS

AMERICAN.CIVIL.LIBERTIES.UNION.OF.KENTUCKY
AMERICAN.IMMIGRATION.LAWYERS.ASSOCIATION
AMERICAN.CIVIL.LIBERTIES.UNION.OF.TENNESSEE
AMERICAN.CIVIL.LIBERTIES.UNION.OF.PENNSYLVANIA

MINNESOTA.CIVIL.LIBERTIES.UNION

NATIONAL.URBAN.LEAGUE.INSTITUTE.FOR.OPPORTUNITY.AND.EQUALITY
AMERICAN.CIVIL.LIBERTIES.UNION.OF.TEXAS
ELECTRONIC.PRIVACY.INFORMATION.CENTER
PRIVACYACTIVISM

ALASKA.CIVIL.LIBERTIES.UNION
ELECTRONIC.FRONTIER.FOUNDATION
COMMITTEE.FOR.PUBLIC.COUNSEL.SERVICES
NEW.YORK.STATE.DEFENDERS.ASSOCIATION
DEFENDING.IMMIGRANTS.PARTNERSHIP
AMERICAN.LIBRARY.ASSOCIATION
AMERICAN.CIVIL.LIBERTIES.UNION.OF.EASTERN.MISSOURI
CENTER.FOR.DEMOCRACY.AND.TECHNOLOGY
MAKE.THE.ROAD.BY.WALKING
AMERICAN.CIVIL.LIBERTIES.UNION.OF.FLORIDA
AMERICAN.CIVIL.LIBERTIES.UNION.OF.OHIO
CONSUMER.PROJECT.ON.TECHNOLOGY
NATIONAL.CONSUMERS.LEAGUE

MEDICAL.LIBRARY.ASSOCIATION
SPECIAL.LIBRARIES.ASSOCIATION
AMERICAN.CIVIL.LIBERTIES.UNION.OF.OREGON

AMERICAN.CIVIL.LIBERTIES.UNION.OF.SAN.DIEGO.AND.IMPERIAL.COUNTIES
INSTITUTE.FOR.THE.ADVANCED.STUDY.OF.HUMAN.SEXUALITY
AMERICAN.CIVIL.LIBERTIES.UNION.OF.NORTHERN.CALIFORNIA
FEMINISTS.FOR.FREE.EXPRESSION
INTERNET.ARCHIVE
AMERICAN.CIVIL.LIBERTIES.UNION.OF.ILLINOIS
AMERICAN.ASSOCIATION.OF.LAW.LIBRARIES
REPORTERS.COMMITTEE.FOR.FREEDOM.OF.THE.PRESS
AMERICAN.CIVIL.LIBERTIES.UNION.OF.SOUTHERN.CALIFORNIA
ASSOCIATION.OF.RESEARCH.LIBRARIES
AMERICAN.CIVIL.LIBERTIES.UNION.OF.MARYLAND
PROJECT.GUTENBERG
RADIO.TELEVISION.NEWS.DIRECTORS.ASSOCIATION
LEGAL.AID.SOCIETY.OF.THE.CITY.OF.NEW.YORK
SOCIETY.OF.PROFESSIONAL.JOURNALISTS
CALIFORNIA.ATTORNEYS.FOR.CRIMINAL.JUSTICE

OHIO.JUSTICE.AND.POLICY.CENTER

Figure 6: Egocentric Network of Jointly Central Node: American Civil Liberties Union

Figure 7: Histogram of Degree Centrality
2000

1500

1000

500

0
0

50

100

150

200

Degree Centrality

total near 2000, or almost half the population of interest groups.
Olson (1965) maintains that smaller groups have a greater chance of success when the action required is largely spontaneous or the goods are exclusive. Because U.S. Supreme Court cases are not spontaneous, it is unlikely
that the speed of the required action is of relevance. However, groups that
choose to sign briefs alone may feel that they represent particularistic interests or that the case itself has only exclusive outcomes. Because the costs of
submitting a brief are relatively low for an interest group, and the beneﬁts
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from bragging rights to their constituents relatively high, regardless of the
outcome, some groups may continually submit alone. Certainly, new interest
groups may submit a brief in order to gain public attention, which suggests
a forward-looking incentive for participation.
Table 3: Percent Lowest Centrality
Node
Centrality
Degree
Betweenness

2000
12.3
68.6

2001
–02
14.2
88.2

2003
–04
10.1
90.0

2005
–06
16.6
87.8

2007 2000
–07
12.3 10.8
97.0 80.9

Degree and Betweenness refer to the percent of interest groups in the
lowest quantile for the respective periods.

As shown in Table ??, ﬁnding 10 percent of interest groups falling in the
lowest quantile for the entire period is not highly unusual. It is, however,
lower than the average for the preceeding periods. By this account, any single
window, apart from 2003 to 2004, overestimates the number of unlinked
interest groups relative to the whole. The lower number of interest groups
with minimal degree centrality in the summed period suggests the importance
of using larger or aggregate windows in the study of interest group networks.
Refering again to Figure 1, it is clear that despite the fact that various
interest groups may be enveloped into networks with other groups over time,
several interest groups continually avoid coalitions. In addition, new groups
continually enter the fray with the consideration of new policies in front
of the Court and the creation of new groups. Over time, interest groups
that may have worked alone on one issue or project often end up working
with others, thereby exposing the network. Short windows may not expose
these underlying networks; and therefore present incomplete pictures of the
network, a point we return to below in our discussion of next steps.

3

Conclusions

We utilized cosigners to United States Supreme Court amicus curiae as indicators of ties between interest groups. As such, this paper presented the
ﬁrst social network analysis of purposive and coordinated interest group relationships. Though largely exploratory, the network structure illuminated
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by these interest group linkages provide an abundance of information about
the central players and overall formation of the network over the ﬁrst seven
years of the 21st century. In addition, it provides a foundation for subsequent
investigations into long-term network development and coordinated interest
group activity before various branches of the government.
We found that the factions are tied together by various central players, who act as hubs, leaving a disparate collection of organizations that
work alone. While the ACLU, NWF and NACDL all play central roles in
the coordinated work of interest groups, they do so in diﬀerent ways. The
NWF, for example, was shown to sign onto briefs with a multitude of signers.
Despite being ostensibly focused on wildlife concerns, it held the strongest
presence in the seven year period by virtue of the participation of numerous
other environmental and wildlife groups. The NWF was directly linked to
the largest number of interest groups, involving, at times only marginally,
wildlife groups.
The NACDL likewise appeared as a powerful player in the associations
of interest groups. It’s presence was characterized by a diﬀerent kind of
centrality. The NACDL linked together interest groups that would otherwise
be unlinked. In other words, it worked broadly. By signing onto briefs
with various groups, it indirectly holds together numerous groups of diverse
interests.
The ACLU exhibited signs of both high betweenness and high degree
centrality. In other words, like the NWF it signed several briefs with a large
number of signatories. And like the NACDL it worked across particular issue
areas whenever civil rights were at play; such is expected given the range of
civil rights concerns engaged by any one Supreme Court case.
We ﬁnd that the majority of interest groups primarily partake in coalition strategies with other groups of similar policy interest and ideological
character. This is in contrast to previous literature that focused only on
one or the other. Some groups, however, have broader interests by deﬁnition. Ultimately, our work and data suggest several subsequent questions
and opportunities pertaining to the coalition strategies of interest groups.

3.1

Next Steps

While we believe that the mapping and description of the lobbyist network
is valuable in its own right, several questions are motivated by the ﬁndings
above. First, to what extent do mere issue areas determine the linkages be24

tween interest groups? According to the graphs above, ideology also plays
a role in the determination of coalitions, however we require additional attribute data and speciﬁc models for these and related questions. We are
particularly concerned that apolitical organization characteristics also play a
role in the development of purposive relationships.
Also of great relevance to our long-term project is the relative impact
of networks on the success of interest groups before various governmental
bodies. Clearly, interest groups engage one another in the output of various
materials and the seeking of various mutual objectives. However, if these
networks have little to no impact on the success of the myriad of outcomes,
that would suggest little need for network analysis - a highly unanticipated
though untested possibility. In addition, we will examine with p* models
which interest group characteristics, such as size, proﬁtability, longevity, and
issue focus, play the biggest role in determining whether the network characteristics of interest groups.
Finally, it is clear from the analysis above that certain interest groups
played atypical roles in the structure of the network. Large, ambitious and
non-policy speciﬁc organizations linked clusters of tightly grouped factions
together. How then do the interest groups themselves perceive their role
in the network? To what extent do diﬀerent players take advantage of their
respective strengths and take note of their respective weaknesses by situating
themselves in particular positions within the graph? Such inquiries demand
additional information and analyses.

3.2

Bigger Picture

We argue that a coordinated, purposive measure of interest group networks
is needed to better understand the multitude of players in our government
and their coalition strategies. We believe that the coalitions formed between
interest groups that have signed onto the same Supreme Court amicus curiae
briefs provides this improved measure.
The project aims to make both theoretical and empirical contributions
to the study of political behavior and network analysis. We build on strong
theories of network analysis to carefully examine widely acknowledged, but
virtually untested claims about the intertwined relationships among interest
groups. Furthermore, through the creation of a new network measure applicable to ﬁfty-ﬁve years of interest group activity and a data set of interest
group characteristics, we provide scholars of interest groups an opportunity
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to study the relative impact of coalitions as they engage the governmental
process.
The state of our democracy depends on the ability of individuals and
organizations to ﬁnd representation for their respective values in the bodies
of government. Organizations, however, do not simply attempt to inﬂuence
government alone. Instead, as network theories suggest, organizations often
collaborate. Combining forces is a time-honored tradition in the pursuit of
political ends, and yet we know relatively little about the gamut of networks
in our political system and the eﬀect of these networks.
A more complete picture of interest group networks will lead to a fuller
understanding of key political players and the behavior of those players, while
also addressing the alternative theoretical perspectives on interest groups.
While invaluable attempts have been made to understand the network of
interest groups across issue area and ideology, purposive network formation
on the part of interest groups has largely heretofore escaped the discipline.
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